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Abstract
The classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell paradigm states that trade and capital mobility are
substitutes, in the sense that trade integration reduces the incentives for capital to ﬂow to
capital-scarce countries. In this paper we show that in a world with heterogeneous ﬁnancial
development, a very diﬀerent conclusion emerges. In particular, in less ﬁnancially developed
economies (South), trade and capital mobility are complements, in the sense that trade integra-
tion increases the return to capital and thus the incentives for capital to ﬂow to South. This
interaction implies that deepening trade integration in South raises net capital inﬂows (or re-
duces net capital outﬂows). It also implies that, at the global level, protectionism may backﬁre
if the goal is to rebalance capital ﬂows.
JEL Codes: E2, F1, F2, F3, F4.
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The process of globalization involves the integration of goods and ﬁnancial markets of heterogeneous
economies. While these two dimensions of integration are deeply intertwined in practice, the
economics literature has kept them largely separate. International trade deals with the former
while macroeconomics with the latter. In this paper we argue that such separation is not warranted
when ﬁnancial frictions are an important source of heterogeneity across countries and sectors.
In particular, we show that in this context trade and net capital ﬂows are complements in less
ﬁnancially developed countries: A process of trade integration increases the incentives for capital
to ﬂow into these economies.I nt h i sc o n t e x t ,aﬁnancially underdeveloped economy that opens the
capital account without liberalizing trade is likely to experience capital outﬂows. An aggressive
trade liberalization can reverse these outﬂows. At the global level, a rise in protectionism may
exacerbate rather than reduce the so called “global imbalances.”
While some of these implications may resonate with practitioners, they are in stark contrast with
those that follow from the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell paradigm (HOM). In the neoclassical
two-good, two-factor model, less developed economies are characterized as being capital scarce,
and the model predicts that a process of trade integration reduces the incentives for capital to ﬂow
into these economies. Hence, trade and capital mobility are substitutes from the point of view of
capital-scarce economies. Furthermore, in the absence of trade frictions, international specialization
has the potential to bring about factor price equalization (FPE) with the rest of the world, making
international capital mobility altogether irrelevant.1
The key diﬀerence between our model and the HOM one, aside from the dynamic aspects that
allow us to talk about savings and capital ﬂows rather than just factor location, is the presence
of ﬁnancial frictions. Motivated by the ﬁndings of King and Levine (1993), Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Manova (2008), and many others, we highlight two dimensions
of heterogeneity in ﬁnancial frictions. First, there is cross-country heterogeneity. The ability to
pledge future output to potential ﬁnanciers is higher in rich “North” than in developing “South.”
Second, there is cross-sectoral heterogeneity. Even when operating under a common ﬁnancial
system, producers in certain sectors ﬁnd it more problematic to obtain ﬁnancing than producers
in others sectors. Paraphrasing Rajan and Zingales (1998), some sectors are more “dependent” on
ﬁnancial infrastructure than others. In this context, both trade and capital ﬂows become market
mechanisms to circumvent the misallocation of capital induced by ﬁnancial frictions in South. If
we close the trade channel, then both physical and ﬁnancial capital outﬂows from South become
the vehicle through which the return to savers and the sectoral allocation of capital are improved
in South. In contrast, with free trade, it is the reorganization of domestic production in South that
1T h en o t i o no fs u b s t i t u t a b i l i t yi nt h eH e c k s c h e r - O h l i nm o d e lh a sb e e ni n t e r p r e t e di na l t e r n a t i v ew a y st ot h eo n ew e
emphasize here. For instance, it is sometimes associated with the prediction that international capital movements tend
to reduce international trade ﬂows. Other times, it is associated with the feature that trade and capital movements
are alternative means to bring about factor price equalization across countries. As we shall see, in our model, capital
movements may well increase trade ﬂows across countries and factor price equalization only attains when both free
trade and free capital mobility are allowed.
1does the heavy-lifting, and by doing so raises the return on capital in South and palliates or even
reverses capital outﬂows.
In order to formalize these insights, in section 2 we develop a standard 2 × 2 (two-factor, two-
sector) general equilibrium model of international trade in which ﬁrms hire capital and labor to
produce two homogenous goods. To capture the role of heterogeneous ﬁnancial frictions across
countries and sectors in the simplest possible way, we enrich the standard model by incorporating a
ﬁnancial market imperfection in one of the sectors, while initially making the two sectors symmetric
in every other respect. The ﬁnancial friction limits the amount of capital allocated to the sector
aﬀected by it.
We ﬁrst consider the autarkic equilibrium of this simple economy in which goods and factor
markets have to clear domestically. In such a case, countries with worse ﬁnancial institutions
feature a lower relative price of the unconstrained sector’s output (since a disproportionate share
of resources ends up being allocated to this sector) and also feature relatively depressed wages and
rental rates of capital. If we now allow capital to move across countries that diﬀer only in ﬁnancial
development, capital ﬂows from the ﬁnancially underdeveloped South to the ﬁnancially developed
North.
These closed (to trade) economy outcomes are in sharp contrast to those when South can
freely trade with a ﬁnancially developed North. We show that in that case, South (incompletely)
specializes in the unconstrained sector and thus becomes a net importer of the output of the
“ﬁnancially dependent” sector. From the point of view of South, trade integration raises the
relative price of the unconstrained sector’s output and the real rental rate of capital. Trade does
not bring about factor price equalization and the rental rate of capital ends up being higher in
South than in North. This implied reversal in the direction of capital ﬂows follows from the fact
that in the free trade equilibrium, wages in the South remain depressed relative to those in North,
which when combined with goods price equalization (a condition absent in the closed economy),
ensures that capitalists earn a higher real return in South than in North.
Although we initially derive our conclusions for the case in which South is a small open economy
and preferences and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, we later demonstrate that the complementarity
between trade and capital mobility remains valid for general homothetic preferences and symmetric
neoclassical production technologies. In particular, in a world in which countries diﬀer only in
ﬁnancial development and sectors diﬀer only in ﬁnancial dependence, trade integration reduces the
gap between the rental rate of capital in North and South, and with free trade, the rental rate of
capital is higher in the less ﬁnancially developed South.
Our benchmark model isolates the eﬀects of cross-country and cross-sectoral heterogeneity in
ﬁnancial frictions on the structure of trade and capital ﬂows. In section 4 we develop a more general
model that introduces Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of international trade into our static model. In
this general model, it continues to be the case that, regardless of factor intensity diﬀerences across
sectors, trade integration raises the rental rate of capital in the South as long as South has com-
parative advantage in the unconstrained sector. We further show that South will necessarily have
2comparative advantage in the unconstrained sector as long as diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development
across countries are suﬃciently large. In the presence of large diﬀerences in aggregate capital-labor
ratios across countries, certain asymmetries in production technologies across sectors could however
translate into South gaining comparative advantage in the constrained sector. For instance, if the
unconstrained sector happened to be much more capital intensive than the constrained sector, then
the autarky relative price of the unconstrained sector might well be lower in the capital-abundant
North than in South. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd no empirical evidence suggesting that such troublesome
cross-sectoral asymmetries in technology are relevant in the real world.
All the statements up to now follow from a static model where the only possible type of capital
ﬂows involves reallocation of a given stock of physical capital across countries. In section 5 we
develop a dynamic model that illustrates that our mechanism has similar implications for capital
ﬂows driven by the allocation of savings across economies. Under the plausible assumption that
neither labor income nor entrepreneurial rents are capitalizable, our model implies that countries
with underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets feature relatively low return to savers under trade and
ﬁnancial autarky, but relatively high return to savers with free trade and ﬁnancial autarky. It
follows that, again, trade and capital inﬂows are complements in South.
Our paper relates to several literatures in international ﬁnance and international trade. From
the point of view of international ﬁnance, the closest models are those studying the role of ﬁnancial
frictions in shaping capital ﬂows. These models are typically cast in terms of one-sector models,
where capital ﬂows is the only mechanism to increase the return to capital in ﬁnancially under-
developed countries. The literature highlighting this mechanism is large and includes Gertler and
Rogoﬀ (1990), Boyd and Smith (1997), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004),
Kraay et al. (2005), Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008), as well as the recent (working) papers
by Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2006), and Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007). There is
also a trade literature emphasizing the role of the interaction between ﬁnancial development and
ﬁnancial dependence in shaping international trade ﬂows. It includes the work of Bardhan and
Kletzer (1987), Beck (2002), Matsuyama (2005), Wynne (2005), Ju and Wei (2006), Becker and
Greenberg (2007) and Manova (2008). These papers, however, focus on deriving (and testing)
implications for trade ﬂows and do not allow for capital mobility.2 In terms of complementarities
b e t w e e nt r a d ea n dc a p i t a lﬂows, our paper shares with Markusen (1983), though his notion of com-
plementarity is quite distinct from ours. In particular, Markusen (1983) shows that capital mobility
can increase gross trade ﬂows in a variety of models in which comparative advantage is not driven
by diﬀerences in capital-labor ratios across countries. In our paper, we focus on a diﬀerent type
of complementarity, one that runs from trade integration to net capital ﬂows. Another diﬀerence
b e t w e e nM a r k u s e n( 1 9 8 3 )a n do u rp a p e ri st h a th ed i dn o te x p l o r et h er o l eo fﬁnancial frictions,
which are of course central in our context.3 Finally, in terms of comparative statics, our extended
2To be precise, section 2 of Matsuyama (2005) includes a discussion of capital ﬂows, but the analysis in that section
is developed in terms of a one-sector model and is thus more related to the international ﬁnance papers mentioned
above.
3Martin and Rey (2006) study the eﬀects of trade integration (modelled as an increase in market size) on the
3model with Heckscher-Ohlin elements has some similarities with the speciﬁc-factors model of Jones
(1971) and Samuelson (1971). Although capital is not sector-speciﬁc in our model, its allocation
across sectors is pinned down by the parameters governing the tightness of the ﬁnancial constraint.
Amano (1977), Brecher and Findlay (1983), Jones (1989) and Neary (1995) study capital mobility
within variants of the speciﬁc-factors model, but the conclusions generally depend on the assumed
pattern of specialization and factor mobility.
2 A Stylized Model of Trade with Financial Frictions
In this section we develop our benchmark model. In order to isolate the main mechanism in the
paper, we make a series of simplifying assumptions that we later relax in sections 4 and 5. In
particular, our benchmark model is static, imposes a speciﬁc log-linear structure and abstracts
from standard Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of comparative advantage.
2.1 The Environment
Consider an economy that employs two factors (capital K and labor L) to produce two homogenous
goods (1 and 2). The country is inhabited by a continuum of measure μ of entrepreneurial capitalists
(or simply entrepreneurs), a continuum of measure 1− μ of rentier capitalists (or simply rentiers),
and a continuum of measure L of workers. All capitalists are endowed with K units of capital
and each worker supplies inelastically one unit of labor, so the aggregate capital-labor ratio of the
economy is K/L, with a fraction μ of K being in the hands of entrepreneurs and the remaining
fraction being held by rentiers. We denote the rental rate of capital by δ and the wage rate by w.
All agents have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences and devote a fraction η of their spending to
sector 1’s output, which we take as the numeraire:
U =
µ
C1
η
¶η µ
C2
1 − η
¶1−η
.( 1 )
Production in both sectors combines capital and labor according to:
Yi = Z (Ki)
α (Li)
1−α , i =1 ,2,( 2 )
where Ki and Li are the amounts of capital and labor employed in sector i and Z is a Hicks-neutral
productivity parameter. From a technological point of view, entrepreneurial and rentier capital are
perfect substitutes. Notice also that, for the time being, we focus on symmetric technologies to
eliminate any source of comparative advantage other than ﬁnancial development.
Goods and labor markets are perfectly competitive, and factors of production are freely mobile
across sectors. If the capital market is also perfectly competitive, then the autarky equilibrium of
likelihood of a ﬁnancial crash in an emerging country. Their model emphasizes a risk-sharing rationale for capital
ﬂows, which is absent in our framework.
4this economy is straightforward to characterize. In particular, given identical technologies in both
sectors, the marginal rate of transformation is equal to −1 and thus the relative price of sector 2’s
output, p,i se q u a lt o1.I ti st h e ne a s i l yv e r i ﬁed that the economy allocates a fraction η of K and
L to sector 1, and the remaining fraction 1 − η to sector 2. If this frictionless economy is open to
international trade and faces an exogenously given relative price p, then it completely specializes
in sector 1 if p<1 and completely specializes in sector 2 if p>1.
2.2 Financial Friction
We shall assume, however, that the capital market has a friction. Consistently with the empirical
literature discussed in the introduction, we assume that the ﬁnancial friction has an asymmetric
eﬀect in the two sectors. To simplify matters, we assume that ﬁnancial contracting in sector 2 is
perfect in the sense that producers in that sector can hire any desired amount of capital at the
equilibrium rental rate δ.
Conversely, there is a ﬁnancial friction in sector 1, which we associate with the production
process in that sector as being relatively “complex.” We appeal to this complexity to justify the
following two assumptions: (i) that only entrepreneurs know how to produce in sector 1 (i.e.,
their “human capital” is essential in that sector), and (ii) that because of informational frictions,
producers in that sector (i.e., entrepreneurs) can only borrow a limited amount of capital. We
capture the latter capital market friction in a stark (though standard in the literature) way by
assuming that lenders are only willing to lend to entrepreneurs a multiple θ−1 of the entrepreneur’s
capital endowment, so entrepreneur i’s investment is constrained by
Ii ≤ θKi = θK, for θ>1.( 3 )
For the purposes of this paper we need not take a particular stance on what is the friction behind
this borrowing constraint. It could be related to an ex-post moral hazard problem, to limited
commitment or to adverse selection. In Appendix A.1, we develop a simple microfoundation for
the ﬁnancial constraint in a model with limited commitment on the part of entrepreneurs.4
Regardless of the source of the constraint, it is clear that if θ is suﬃciently large, then entrepre-
neurs are able to jointly allocate a fraction η of capital to the constrained sector 1.I ns u c hac a s e ,
constraint (3) does not bind and the equilibrium is identical to that of the frictionless economy
described above. Hereafter we focus on the more interesting case in which θ is low enough so that
(3) binds. This requires:
Assumption 1: μθ < η.
4A simplifying assumption in our setup is that the credit multiplier θ is independent of the rental rate δ.A g h i o n ,
Banerjee and Piketty (1999) provide a microfoundation for this rental-rate insensitivity in a model with ex-post moral
hazard and costly state veriﬁcation. Our model in Appendix A.1 can also deliver such insensitivity, but we show
that our main results are preserved in an alternative formulation in which θ is a function of factor prices. See Tirole
(2006) for an overview of diﬀerent models of ﬁnancial contracting.
52.3 Closed Economy Equilibrium
We next turn to explore the autarky equilibrium of this economy with a particular emphasis on
the determination of the rental rate of capital δ. As noted above, under Assumption 1 the ﬁnancial
constraint (3) binds, each entrepreneur invests an amount θK (of which (θ−1)K is borrowed), and
the aggregate amount of capital allocated to sector 1 is:
K1 = μθK < ηK.( 4 )
This imposes that entrepreneurs invest all their endowment of K in sector 1 and never become
rentiers, but this is necessarily a feature of the equilibrium since, as we will see shortly, entrepreneurs
can always obtain a higher return by doing so.
Because labor can freely move across sectors, it is allocated to equate the value of its marginal
product, which using (4) implies
(1 − α)Z
µ
μθK
L1
¶α
= p(1 − α)Z
µ
(1 − μθ)K
L − L1
¶α
,( 5 )
where, remember, p denotes the price of good 2 in terms of good 1 (the numeraire).
From the consumer’s ﬁrst order condition and goods market clearing we have
(1 − η)Z (μθK)
α (L1)
1−α = pηZ ((1 − μθ)K)
α (L − L1)
1−α ,( 6 )
which together with the labor market condition in (5) implies that
L1 = ηL (7)
and
p =
µ
μθ(1 − η)
η(1 − μθ)
¶α
< 1,( 8 )
where the inequality follows again from Assumption 1.
As indicated by equations (4) and (7), in our benchmark model ﬁnancial frictions do not distort
the allocation of labor across sectors but shift capital to the unconstrained sector (sector 2). As a
result, sector 2’s output is “oversupplied” and its relative price p is depressed. The tighter is the
ﬁnancial constraint (the lower θ), the lower is the relative price p.
Financial frictions also have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the rental rate of capital δ. To see this, notice
that because only rentiers place their capital in sector 2, the rental rate of capital (in terms of the
sector 2 output) will necessarily equal the marginal product of capital in that sector, that is
δ
p
= αZ
µ
(1 − μθ)
(1 − η)
K
L
¶α−1
.
6Using equation (8), we then also have that
δ =
μθ(1 − η)
(1 − μθ)η
αZ
µ
μθ
η
K
L
¶α−1
.( 9 )
Note that both δ/p and δ are increasing functions of the degree of ﬁnancial contractibility θ.
Other things equal, less ﬁnancially developed economies feature depressed rental returns to capital.
The intuition for this result is clear: a tighter borrowing constraint reduces the ability of the
constrained sector to attract capital, thus increasing the capital-labor ratio in the unconstrained
sector and reducing its marginal product in terms of sector 2 output (i.e., reducing δ/p)a n da l s o
in terms of the numeraire good (remember that p also falls in θ).
So far we have been silent on the return obtained by entrepreneurs. In the frictionless economy,
entrepreneurial and rentier capital are perfect substitutes and both obtain a common rental rate δ.
However, when the borrowing constraint (3) binds, entrepreneurial capital becomes relatively scarce
and entrepreneurs obtain a premium over the equilibrium rental rate of capital. In particular, their
return per unit of capital is
R = δ + λθ, (10)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the ﬁnancial constraint (3).5 In equilibrium,
the marginal product of capital in the constrained sector 1 needs to equal δ + λ,f r o mw h i c hw e
obtain:
λ =
µ
1 −
μθ(1 − η)
(1 − μθ)η
¶
αZ
µ
μθ
η
K
L
¶α−1
,( 1 1 )
which is strictly positive (under Assumption 1) and also decreasing in θ. Hence, the shadow value
of entrepreneurial capital is higher in economies with less developed ﬁnancial markets. In sum, we
have shown that:
Proposition 1 In the closed economy equilibrium, an increase in ﬁnancial contractibility θ raises
the relative price of the unconstrained sector and the real rental rate of capital, and reduces the
shadow value of entrepreneurial capital.
It is worth noting that the last statement in the Proposition does not imply that the welfare
of entrepreneurs is necessarily decreasing in θ. In particular, it is easily veriﬁed that entrepreneurs
would always favor an increase in θ whenever the initial θ is low and α is large enough. Finally,
it also straightforward to show that both real wages (measured in terms of the ideal price index
associated with (1)) and welfare are increasing in θ. In sum, economies with more developed
ﬁnancial systems necessarily attain higher real wages and welfare levels.
5The return R follows from R = θ(δ+λ)−(θ−1)δ. Notice that the fact that R>δjustiﬁes our assumption above
that entrepreneurs invest all their endowment of capital in sector 1. Furthermore, given that we have constant returns
to scale in all factors, the Lagrange multiplier λ would be common to all entrepreneurs even if their endowments of
K were not identical. This feature will become useful in the dynamic version of the model.
72.4 Open Economy Equilibrium
Consider now a world economy consisting of two countries (North and South) of the type described
above. In order to isolate the role of ﬁnancial development in shaping trade and capital ﬂows, we
assume that the two countries are identical in all respects except for their level of ﬁnancial devel-
opment and their size. In particular, both countries share common preferences and technologies —
as in (1) and (2)— and are endowed with the same capital-labor ratio, but North is more ﬁnancially
developed (θN >θ S) and it is also much larger (though we show in the next section that our sub-
stantive implications do not depend on this assumption). In the absence of trade in goods between
these two countries, the equilibrium in each economy is as described above and we can conclude
from Proposition 1 that the relative price p and the real rental rate of capital (δ, δ/p)a r el o w e ri n
the South than in the North.
We next compare this situation to one in which the North and the South can freely trade goods
among themselves. Because we are particularly interested in the eﬀects of trade liberalization in
the South, we focus for now on the case in which North is so large relative to South, that the free
trade equilibrium relative price p corresponds to the autarky one in the North, that is
p = pN
aut =
Ã
μθN (1 − η)
η
¡
1 − μθN¢
!α
< 1,( 1 2 )
In other words, South is now a small open economy facing a ﬁxed world relative price p>p S
aut
(see Proposition 1). The second inequality in (12) reﬂects our assumption that ﬁnancial constraints
bind in the North as well. In section 4, we study the more general case of trade integration between
two sizeable economies and also brieﬂy consider the possibility that ﬁnancial constraints do not
bind in the North (see footnote 22).
2.4.1 Trade Integration and the Rental Rate of Capital
Let us then study the equilibrium of a small open economy with a level of ﬁnancial development
given by θ.6 As argued at the end of section 2.1, whenever facing a relative price p<1,a
frictionless small South would like to fully specialize in the production of good 1. However the
borrowing constraint in that sector prevents this by limiting the aggregate allocation of capital to
that sector to be no larger than μθK. Thus, as long as p<1, Southern entrepreneurs continue
to obtain a premium when allocating their capital to sector 1 and, as a result, the distribution of
capital across sectors is identical to that in the closed economy.
Conversely, the allocation of labor across sectors is aﬀected by the access to international trade
in goods. Condition (5) equating the value of the marginal product of labor across sectors still needs
to hold in equilibrium, but the allocation of labor no longer needs to be consistent with goods market
clearing as dictated by equation (6) above. This is the distinguishing eﬀect of international trade
6For the sake of generality, we omit the superscript S when referring to Southern variables in this section. Our
expressions also apply to a small open economy with η/μ > θ > θ
N, though in that case trade integration leads to a
decrease in p in that economy.
8in the model: it detaches the allocation of factors across sectors from local demand conditions.
Instead, South faces an exogenously given relative price p, and thus (5) yields
L1 =
μθL
(1 − μθ)p1/α + μθ
.( 1 3 )
The amount of labor allocated to the ﬁnancially constrained sector 1 is decreasing in p and
increasing in θ.I n t u i t i v e l y ,al a r g e rp raises the value of the marginal product of labor in sector 2,
thus pulling labor away from sector 1. Similarly, a lower θ increases the amount of capital allocated
to the unconstrained sector 2, thus again raising the marginal product of labor in that sector.When
the world relative price p happens to coincide with South’s autarky price (i.e., when θN = θ), then
L1 coincides as well with the autarky allocation, i.e., L1 = ηL. But when international trade
allows South to face a less depressed relative price p, South tilts the allocation of labor toward
the unconstrained sector 2, thus specializing in the less “ﬁnancially dependent” sector. The result
is intuitive: the depressed relative price p under autarky indicates that South has comparative
advantage in the unconstrained sector and thus it is natural that South exports this good in the
free trade equilibrium.7
The equilibrium rental rate of the small open economy is again pinned down by the marginal
product of capital in the unconstrained sector. Using equations (4) and (13) we can express the
real rental rate in terms of good 2 as
δ
p
= αZ
µ³
(1 − μθ)+μθp−1/α
´ K
L
¶α−1
,
which is clearly an increasing function of p. It is then obvious that the real rental in terms of the
n u m e r a i r eg o o d1i sa l s oi n c r e a s i n gi np:
δ = αZp
µ³
(1 − μθ)+μθp−1/α
´ K
L
¶α−1
(14)
The eﬀects of trade on the rental rate of capital are tightly related to the induced changes in the
sectoral capital-labor ratios. As shown above, an increase in p reduces L1 while holding constant
K1, and thus it increases K1/L1 and reduces K2/L2. It is then clear that the marginal product of
capital in sector 2 (and hence δ/p) increases when p increases, which immediately implies that δ is
also increasing in p.8 In sum, we have that:
Proposition 2 Trade integration raises the real rental rate of capital in the ﬁnancially underde-
veloped South.
The key for the result is that, by allowing the South to specialize in a sector with lower ﬁnancial
7It is straightforward to show that the volume of Southern exports of good 2 is positive if and only if θ
N >θ .S e e
section 4 and Appendix A.2 for a more general proof of this result.
8The counterpart of this result is that trade liberalization reduces the “premium” remuneration obtained by
Southern entrepreneurs in sector 1 (that is, λ is decreasing in p). In fact, one can show that the total return to
entrepreneurial capital (R = δ + λθ) is necessarily decreasing in p as well.
9MPL1/p
MPL2,aut
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Figure 1: Trade Integration and the Rental Rate of Capital
frictions, international trade reduces the negative impact of ﬁnancial underdevelopment on the
rental rate of capital. In the next section we will show that this result holds in much more general
environments than the one studied in our benchmark model.9
Figure 1 illustrates the beneﬁcial eﬀect of trade integration on the Southern rental rate of
capital. The ﬁgure depicts the value of the marginal product of labor in each sector in terms of the
unconstrained sector output (i.e., MPL1/p and MPL2). Due to diminishing marginal returns to
labor, the schedule MPL1/p is decreasing in the allocation of labor to sector 1 as measured from
left to right, relative to the origin O1. Similarly, the schedule MPL2 is decreasing in the allocation
of labor to sector 2, as measured from right to left starting at the origin O2. The distance between
the two origins is given by the endowment of labor in the South. Equation (5) then dictates that
the equilibrium value of L1 is given by the intersection of these two curves. It is then obvious that
an increase in p (which shifts the schedule MPL1/p down and to the left) will lead to a reduction
in L1 and an increase in L2.10 Because the allocation of capital is independent of p,t h eg r a p ha l s o
depicts the eﬀect of trade integration on the rental rate δ/p. In particular, total payments to capital
in sector 2 are given by the area to the right of the schedule MPL2 and above the equilibrium
marginal product of labor. Because all pieces of capital obtain the same return δ/p in that sector,
it is clear that the rental increases in an amount proportional to the shaded area in the graph.
Hence, δ/p rises when p rises, and a fortiori so does δ.T h e ﬁgure also makes it clear that trade
integration lowers the wage-rental ratio in the South.
9It can also be shown that trade integration necessarily raises welfare in the South (see section 4 for a general
proof of this result in our static model).
10Even though the marginal product of labor in terms of good 2 falls with trade, one can show that the real wage
w/p
1−η will in fact increase with the increase in p.
102.4.2 The Cross-Section of Rental Rates
Given equation (14), we can also study the eﬀects of an improvement in ﬁnancial contractibility,
that is an increase in θ, on the equilibrium rental rate of capital. This exercise is useful because
it serves to characterize the cross-section of rental rates across economies that trade at a common
relative price p but have diﬀerent values of θ (e.g., North and South). Remember that in the
autarky equilibrium we established that both δ/p and δ were increasing in θ, and thus the rental
rate was higher in the North than in the South. Conversely, equation (14) indicates that δ (and
thus also δ/p since p is given) is now decreasing in θ. Hence, trade integration not only raises the
real rental rate of capital in ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries (Proposition 1), but it actually
leaves that rental rate at a level that is higher than in relatively ﬁnancially developed countries.
This somewhat paradoxical result can be explained as follows. Because both countries allocate
some labor to each of the two sectors, the zero proﬁt condition in sector 2 ensures that
p =
µ
δ (θ)
α
¶α µ
w(θ)
1 − α
¶1−α
,
where the right-hand side is the unit cost in sector 2. It is then clear that in the free trade
equilibrium it can no longer be the case that an economy with a low value of θ features both
depressed wages and a depressed rental rate of capital, as was the case under autarky. Moreover,
a few steps of algebra show that the wage is increasing in ﬁnancial development as long as p<1:
w =( 1− α)Z
µ³
(1 − μθ)p1/α + μθ
´ K
L
¶α
. (15)
Put diﬀerently, a small-open economy with a lower θ features higher rates of return to capital
“because” it has depressed wages. The depressed wage follows from the fact that, even if the
aggregate capital-labor ratio K/L is identical in both countries, under free trade the capital-labor
ratio in both sectors is lower in the low-θ South than in the high-θ North. In sector 1, it is lower
because entrepreneurs earn higher rents in the South than in the North and hence the cost of capital
is higher. In sector 2, it is lower because when the economy opens to trade the South specializes in
(i.e., shifts labor to) this sector, which is the capital-intensive sector of the economy.11
To see this more formally, let us develop a local proof of the eﬀect of an increase in θ in the
open economy (that is, of a North that has an inﬁnitesimal ﬁnancial advantage over South). We
can decompose the aggregate capital labor ratio, k ≡ K/L, into a weighted average of the sectoral
capital-labor ratios, k1 ≡ K1/L1 and k2 ≡ K2/L2, with weights ψ1 = L1/L and 1−ψ1, respectively:
ψ1k1 +( 1− ψ1)k2 = k.
11Of course, if we instead have a situation where North has a higher aggregate capital-labor ratio, then the depressed
w a g er e s u l tc a nh o l de v e nw h e nt h ec o n s t r a i n e ds e c t o r ’ st e c hnology is relatively capital-intensive. We return to this
generalization later in the paper.
11Total diﬀerentiation of this expression yields:
(k2 − k1)dψ1 = ψ1dk1 +( 1− ψ1)dk2. (16)
Note that the left-hand side of (16) is positive because a higher θ is associated with specialization
toward sector 1 (dψ1 > 0) and because the ﬁnancial constraint makes sector 1 less capital intensive
than sector 2 (k1 <k 2). Because the value of the marginal product of labor is equated in both
sectors, dk1 and dk2 must have the same sign (p is held constant in the exercise), and this sign must
clearly be positive to match the sign of the left-hand side of (16). In sum, we have that dk1 > 0and
dk2 > 0, and hence wages are higher when θ is higher.12
We can summarize the results of this section as follows:13
Proposition 3 In the free trade equilibrium, South produces both goods and is a net importer of the
“ﬁnancially dependent” good 1. Furthermore, free trade does not result in factor price equalization:
the wage rate is lower in the South than in the North (wS <w N), while the rental rate of capital
is higher in the South than in the North (δS >δ N).
3 Trade and Capital Mobility as Complements
As usual in international trade theory, so far we have studied scenarios in which goods can freely
move across countries, but factors of production cannot. In this section we consider the implications
of allowing for physical capital mobility. Following the lead of Mundell (1957), we study the
interaction of capital mobility and trade integration by comparing the incentives for capital mobility
with and without trade frictions in our benchmark model.
3.1 Capital Mobility with Large Trade Frictions
Consider ﬁrst the case with trade frictions. It is obviousl yt h ec a s et h a tw i t hp r o h i b i t i v et r a d ec o s t s
for both goods, there would never be an incentive for capital to move across borders, even in the
presence of factor price diﬀerences across countries. The reason is that, under those circumstances,
there would not be any vehicle to repatriate rental payments from abroad. Consider thus a situation
in which trade in one of the two goods (say good 2) is prohibitive, while trade in the other good
(say good 1) is costless. Without capital mobility, the equilibrium is then as described in section 2.3
above. Despite the tradeability of good 1, with free trade in just one good, South cannot specialize
in its comparative advantage sector and the equilibrium is identical to the autarkic one. From
equation (9), it is then clear that in such a case we have δN >δ S. In words, despite both countries
12In our benchmark Cobb-Douglas model there is a straightforward alternative proof of the depressed wage mech-
anism: In this economy the share of labor is 1−α, hence wages are proportional to aggregate output (productivity).
However, for a given p<1, output increases with the share of factors allocated to sector 1, and we have shown that
this share is increasing with respect to θ.
13One can also show that the shadow value of cash is not equated across countries either, and remains at a higher
level in the South than in the North, i.e., λ
S >λ
N.
12sharing the same aggregate capital-labor ratio, the rental rate of capital is higher in North than in
South.
If we then allow for physical capital mobility, rentiers in South have an incentive to move their
endowment of capital to North. The counterpart of this ﬂow of capital is a positive net import
of good 1 in South in an amount equal to the rental payments of the capital stock exported from
South to North.14 The amount of non-entrepreneurial capital FS→N that needs to ﬂow to North
in order to ensure that δS converges up to the (unaﬀected) Northern rental δN is cumbersome to
compute, but using (5) and imposing goods-market clearing, we ﬁnd that it is implicitly given by
³
(1 − μθS)η − (η + α(1 − η)) FS→N
K
´α ³
1 − μθS − (1 + α(1 − η)) FS→N
K
´1−α
1 − μθN
µ
θN
ηθS
¶α
=1 .
Note that FS→N/K is necessarily increasing in θN and decreasing in θS. Hence, the larger the
diﬀerence in ﬁnancial contractibility, the larger the share of Southern capital that ﬂows out to
North.15 As a counterpart of this capital ﬂow, South imports good 1 in an amount MS
1 = δNFS→N.
This result bears some resemblance to those derived in the literature arguing that ﬁnancial fric-
tions may help explain the Lucas (1990) paradox (Gertler and Rogoﬀ, 1990, Shleifer and Wolfenzon,
2002, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2004, Kraay et al., 2005). In a world in which capital-scarce countries
also are ﬁnancially underdeveloped, our closed-economy equilibrium can help rationalize why capital
does not ﬂow to those countries.
Notice that we have restricted our analysis to the case involving mobility of rentier capital.
Because the return to entrepreneurial capital varies across countries, there might be an incentive
for that capital to move across borders as well. Notice, however, that in order to arbitrage away
entrepreneurial capital return diﬀerentials, it is not suﬃcient for entrepreneurs to simply move
their physical capital abroad. Only when the movement of capital is accompanied by a movement
of entrepreneurial ability, corporate governance or of the entrepreneur himself, will the latter be
able to capture some of the return diﬀerential. In practice, the costs involved in the movement of
these additional factors may far outweigh the costs of pure physical capital mobility. Regardless, of
these considerations, as we argued above, the eﬀect of θ on the return to entrepreneurial capital is
ambiguous in the closed economy case, so the direction of capital ﬂows under autarky is in general
be ambiguous.
14The assumption that rental payments are settled in sector 1 output is not important. In the case in which good
2 serves as the means of payment, it is still the case that some Southern rentiers decide to move their capital to the
North. The reason for this is that in autarky both δ and δ/p are increasing in θ. Obviously, in that alternative case,
South would import good 2 rather than good 1, but this is inconsequential for the substantive results here.
15If South is large enough, this (physical) capital ﬂow has a non-negligible eﬀect on the rental rate δ
N in North.
In such a case, the required capital ﬂow F
S→N c o n t i n u e st ob ei n c r e a s i n gi nθ
N/θ
S but it is quantitatively smaller
(relative to South’s capital).
133.2 Capital Mobility with Small Trade Frictions
We next consider the case in which there is free trade in both goods. Conceptually, this is analogous
to considering a situation in which there is substantial heterogeneity in ﬁnancial dependence across
the set of goods that are traded in world markets. Our results in Propositions 2 and 3 indicate that,
with free trade, the rental rate of capital in South is higher than under autarky and also exceeds
the same rental return in the North, that is δS >δ N. It then follows that if we allow rentiers
to move their endowments across borders, capital now moves from North to South. Furthermore,
because the allocation of capital to the constrained sector in South is bounded above by μθSK,
Northern capital ﬂowing to South only increases the amount of capital employed in sector 2 (i.e.,
the Southern export sector).
Using equations (5), (9), (14), and (12), the exact capital ﬂow required to ensure rental rate
equalization is now given by
FN→S
K
=
¡
η − μθN¢¡
θN − θS¢
θN (1 − η)
,
and again vanishes when θS → θN. Importantly, because the capital ﬂow makes both countries
share a common relative price p and a common rental rate δ, wages w and the shadow price λ
are also equalized across countries. Hence, as in the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model, free
good and factor mobility lead to factor price equalization. An important diﬀerence is that our
model requires both types of mobility for equalization to take place.
Our results show that, from the point of view of South, trade integration and capital inﬂows
are complements in the sense that a process trade integration increases the incentives for capital
to ﬂow to ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries. Our benchmark model illustrates the power of this
complementarity in a particularly strong way in that moving from autarky to free trade necessarily
reverses the direction of capital ﬂows across countries.
The complementarity between trade ﬂows and capital mobility in our model is in sharp contrast
with the substitutability present in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. As shown by Mundell
(1957), in that model, a process of trade integration necessarily lowers the rental rate of capi-
tal in capital-scarce countries and reduces the incentives for capital to ﬂow to those economies.
Furthermore, under certain circumstances, a move toward free trade leads to factor price equaliza-
tion and eliminates the incentive for capital to move to those countries altogether. Hence, in the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell world, trade and capital mobility are substitutes from the point of view of
capital-scarce countries. As we will document in the next section, capital-scarce countries also tend
to be ﬁnancially underdeveloped and this makes our opposite conclusions particularly relevant.
Although we have focused on a discussion of capital ﬂows under autarky or free trade, our
model can easily accommodate cases with intermediate trade frictions. For instance, maintaining
the assumption that the numeraire good 1 is freely tradable, we can let good 2 be subject to an
iceberg transport cost such that a fraction τ ∈ (0,1) o ft h eg o o di sl o s ti nt r a n s i t . B e c a u s ei n
equilibrium South exports good 2, this is formally equivalent to North levying a tariﬀ on Southern
imports. Alternatively, we could have assumed that the trade friction is in sector 1. This would lead
14to identical expressions, but the trade friction would then have analogous eﬀects to an import tariﬀ
levied by South (with the tariﬀ revenue being wasted). In either case, we can think of a reductions
in τ as a reduction in transportation costs or as a trade liberalization episode. Given our assumption
that South is a small open economy, the trade friction amounts to Southern producers facing relative
prices equal to pN (1 − τ) rather than pN (as long as pN (1 − τ) >p S
aut), and thus the trade friction
τ has a monotonic eﬀect on the relative price p faced by South. Because the Southern rental rate
of capital is increasing in this relative price p, we then obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 There exists a unique level of trade frictions ¯ τ ∈
¡
0,1 − pS
aut/pN¢
such that for
τ<¯ τ we have δN <δ S,w h i l ef o rτ>¯ τ we have δN >δ S. Consequently, (physical) capital
migrates South when τ<¯ τ and North if τ>¯ τ.
This Proposition generalizes our “reversal of capital ﬂows” result and it is at the core of our
main result regarding the complementarity between trade and capital mobility. The particular value
for the threshold integration level ¯ τ cannot be derived in closed form, but applying the implicit
function theorem to (14), we obtain that ∂¯ τ/∂θS < 0. In words, the lower is ﬁnancial development
in South, the lower is the amount of trade integration needed to ensure that capital ﬂows into South
when allowing for capital mobility. Intuitively, the wage is particularly depressed in regions with
less developed ﬁnancial markets, and hence the incentive for capital to ﬂow in is particularly high.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that with positive trade frictions, it is no longer the case that
trade integration and free physical capital mobility necessarily lead to factor price equalization.
Even when the direction of capital ﬂows is from North to South, the presence of trade frictions
ensures that wages in South remain depressed even with frictionless capital mobility.
4 Robustness, Generalizations and Discussion
Our benchmark model isolates the eﬀects of cross-country and cross-sectoral heterogeneity in ﬁnan-
cial frictions on the structure of trade and capital ﬂows. In this section, we introduce Heckscher-
Ohlin determinants of international trade into the analysis. The purpose of this extension is twofold.
On the one hand, we seek to explore the robustness of our results to more general speciﬁcations of
preferences and technology. On the other hand, we want to study how the standard results of the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model are modiﬁed by the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. For this reason,
we focus for the most part on the range of parameter values for which the ﬁnancial constraint binds.
4.1 The General Model
The model is a simple generalization of our benchmark static model. The only modiﬁcations are
that we relax our strong assumptions regarding preferences and technology, we allow for cross-
country variation in aggregate capital-labor ratios, and we let both countries be economically large.
Our assumptions are the standard ones in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. On the preference side, we
assume that all agents in the world have identical homothetic preferences so that we can express
15demand in sector 1 relative to demand in sector 2 as a general function κ(p) of the relative price p.
The only restriction we place on κ(p) is that it is non-decreasing. On the technology side, we assume
that both countries have access to the same technologies to produce goods 1 and 2, and that these
technologies feature constant returns to scale, continuously diminishing marginal products and no
factor intensity reversals. We denote these technologies by Fi (Ki,L i) and allow F1 (·) and F2 (·)
to diﬀer. Furthermore, the North and the South are endowed with potentially diﬀerent aggregate
capital-labor ratios, which we denote by KN/LN and KS/LS, respectively. We next explore the
robustness of our main results to this more general environment, which we refer to as our “general
model”. For the most part, we focus on discussing our results verbally or graphically and relegate
most mathematical details to Appendix A.2.
4.2 Complementarity between Trade and Capital Movements
One might have expected that when we introduce Heckscher-Ohlin features into our framework,
o u rc o m p l e m e n t a r i t yr e s u l tw o u l db eb l u r r e db yt he standard Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In
particular, it seems reasonable that if the South is not just ﬁnancially underdeveloped, but is also
relatively capital-scarce, then a process of trade liberalization will lead to increased specialization
in the labor-intensive sector, and will push down the relative demand for capital and its equilibrium
rental rate. More speciﬁcally, one might worry that our complementarity result is driven by the
fact that, in the benchmark model, the unconstrained sector (which is the sector in which South
has comparative advantage) is actually the relatively capital intensive one.
Perhaps surprisingly, we next argue that as long as South has comparative advantage in the
unconstrained sector, then a process of trade liberalization will increase the Southern real rental
rate of capital regardless of factor intensity diﬀerences across sectors. More precisely, as long as
the South features a relative price p under autarky lower than that in North (i.e., pS
aut <p N
aut),
Proposition 2 will continue to be valid even when the technology in sector 2 is signiﬁcantly more
labor intensive than that in sector 1 (or vice versa) and even when the Northern capital-labor ratio
is much higher than that in the South. In particular, we can state that:
Proposition 5 In our general model, it continues to be the case that, as long as the autarky relative
price p is lower in South than in North, trade integration reduces the wage-rental ratio and increases
the real rental rate of capital in South. As a result, trade integration increases the incentives for
capital to ﬂow into South.
In order to see the intuition for this “anti-Stolper-Samuelson” result, it suﬃces to go back
to Figure 1. Remember that in illustrating the complementarity result through that graph, we
only appealed to diminishing marginal productivity of labor in production and to the fact that
trade integration was associated with an increase in p.16 In particular, the fact that production
16Note that our assumption of homothetic preferences implies that, provided that p
S
aut <p
N
aut,ap r o c e s so ft r a d e
integration will always lead the South to face a higher relative price p, even when South is not a small open economy.
See the next subsection and Appendix A.2 for more details.
16technologies were assumed symmetric in the benchmark model played no role. The key feature of
our model is that, regardless of relative factor intensities, as p rises the marginal productivity of
factors in the unconstrained sector rises, but only labor is released from the constrained sector. As
a result, regardless of the relative capital intensity of the two sectors, an increase in p reduces the
capital-labor ratio in sector 2, thereby reducing the wage-rental ratio and increasing the real rental
rate of capital.17
It may be apparent to the savvy reader that the generality of our complementarity result
is connected to a well-known result in the speciﬁc factors model (see Jones, 1971, Samuelson,
1971), namely that trade integration increases the real reward of the type of capital speciﬁct ot h e
comparative advantage sector. In our model, physical capital is not sector-speciﬁc, but the rents
obtained by entrepreneurial capital are sector-speciﬁc due to the heterogeneity in ﬁnancial frictions
across sectors. As a result, even though trade integration increases the marginal product of capital
in sector 2, entrepreneurs are reluctant to move their capital to that sector because of the loss in
rents associated with that move.
Despite these similarities, our model is quite distinct from the speciﬁc factors model. In that
model, one could obtain just about any pattern of comparative advantage and factor mobility
by appropriate choices of the endowments of each type of capital as well as their assumed ease of
mobility across borders. By linking the extent of capital mobility (both across sectors as well across
countries) to ﬁnancial frictions, our model provides sharp predictions for the pattern of comparative
advantage as well as for the incentives for capital to ﬂow across borders with and without trade
integration.18
4.3 Comparative Advantage
The previous subsection showed that our main complementarity result is quite general and only
requires that South has comparative advantage in the unconstrained sector, in the sense that the
autarky relative price p is lower in South than in North. Our benchmark model satisﬁes this
property due to the lower level of ﬁnancial development in South, though one may wonder whether
the result was dependent on particular functional form assumptions. More signiﬁcantly, in our
general model the autarky relative price p is also aﬀected by the interaction between relative factor
abundance and relative factor intensity, and this complicates the relative ranking of pN
aut and pS
aut.
For instance, if North happens to be relatively capital abundant, so KN/LN >K S/LS,a n dt h e
unconstrained sector happens to be relatively capital intensive, then it is theoretically possible
17In contrast, in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, an increase in the relative price of the labor intensive good leads to
am o v eo fl a b o rand capital to that sector. Furthermore, because the capital-labor ratio of the absorbing sector is
lower than that of the sector releasing factors, an increase of the wage-rental (and a decrease of the real rental rate)
is needed to accommodate that shift.
18For more on this, see the previous version of our paper in Antràs and Caballero (2007). There, we speciﬁed
a perfectly competitive three-factor model that featured the same e q u i l i b r i u ma so u rm o d e la n de l a b o r a t e do nt h e
diﬀerences between our framework and a standard speciﬁc-factors model. The development of such an analogous
competitive model allowed us to conclude that, in our general static model, there necessarily exist welfare gains from
trade for each country, despite the presence of ﬁnancial frictions.
17that the North would gain comparative advantage in the unconstrained sector 2, despite its more
sophisticated ﬁnancial system. Less trivially, if the unconstrained sector features particularly high
complementary between capital and labor relative to the constrained sector, the relative abundance
of capital in the North could also generate a large relative supply of good 2 in the North, and an
associated low relative price p under autarky. More formally, in Appendix A.2, we prove the
following result:
Proposition 6 In the closed economy equilibrium of our general model, an increase in ﬁnancial
contractibility θ necessarily raises the relative price p of the unconstrained sector. An increase in
the aggregate capital-labor ratio will raise this relative price p if and only if
α1
(1 − α1)σ1
−
α2
(1 − α2)σ2
> 0, (17)
where αi is one minus the labor share in sector i =1 ,2,a n dσi is the elasticity of substi-
tution between capital and labor in the same sector i (i.e., ∂ (lnKi/Li)/∂ ln(w/ρ) where ρ =
(Fi (Ki,L i) − wLi)/Ki).
The ﬁrst statement of the proposition conﬁrms that the negative (partial) correlation between p
and θ identiﬁed in our benchmark model remains valid for general neoclassical production functions
and general homothetic preferences. The intuition for the generality of this result is most easily
conveyed through graphical analysis (see Appendix A.2 for mathematical details). Figure 2 depicts
the production possibility frontier for the North and the South, when the two countries diﬀer only
in their level of θ. As long as the ratio of sector 2 output to sector 1 output is high, the ﬁnancial
constraint (3) will not bind and the two PPFs will coincide. Nevertheless, for a high enough ratio
Y1/Y2,t h eﬁnancial constraint will bind and the Southern PPF is obtained by bowing the Northern
one in, in a manner that makes the slope of the PPF lower in the South for any ratio Y1/Y2 in that
region. Coupled with our assumption of identical homothetic preferences, this necessarily implies
that the relative autarky price p must be lower in South than in North.
This theoretical result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Manova (2008), who provides empirical
evidence suggesting that, controlling for several factors, ﬁnancially developed countries indeed tend
to feature disproportionately high export volumes in the set of industries that Rajan and Zingales
(1997) identiﬁed as being ﬁnancially dependent (namely, sectors in which ﬁrms have a relatively
high fraction of total capital expenditures not ﬁnanced by internal cash ﬂow).
The combination of Propositions 5 and 6 suggests that our main complementarity result in
the benchmark model will continue to hold in the general model whenever diﬀerences in capital-
labor ratios between ﬁnancially developed and ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries are small or
whenever the term in the left-hand-side of (17) is small. In practice, however, ﬁnancially developed
countries tend to be signiﬁcantly capital-abundant relative to ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries.
In Manova’s (2008) dataset, for instance, the cross-country correlation between a standard measure
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of θ on Autarky Relative Price p
of ﬁnancial development and physical capital per capita is positive and high (0.678).19
As mentioned above and as captured by condition (17) in Proposition 6, in the presence of
aggregate capital-labor ratio diﬀerences between the North and the South, the autarky relative
price p could actually be lower in the capital-abundant North if the constrained sector featured
a particularly high labor share or a particularly low elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor. As explained in more detail in Appendix A.3, none of these conditions seems to ﬁnd much
support at least in U.S. data.20 In particular, we compute the Rajan and Zingales’ measure of
ﬁnancial dependence at the 3-digit SIC level, averaged over the period 1980-89, and we correlate it
with (a) the labor share in that industry (1 − αi); (b) an estimate of the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor in that sector (σi); and (c) the term αi/((1 − αi)σi) which is the
relevant one according to theory. Appendix A.3 contains more details on the construction of these
variables. We ﬁnd very low correlations between ﬁnancial dependence and each of these variables:
the particular values are 0.034, 0.012, and -0.026, respectively.
We conclude from these ﬁndings, together with those of Manova (2008), that ﬁnancially un-
derdeveloped countries appear to indeed gain comparative advantage in relatively ﬁnancially un-
constrained sectors. This implies that it is natural to associate trade integration in ﬁnancially
underdeveloped countries with an increase in the relative price p,a n di nl i g h to fP r o p o s i t i o n5 ,w e
can conclude that trade integration increases the incentives for capital to ﬂow to these ﬁnancially
underdeveloped countries.
19This corresponds to the correlation between the amount of credit extended by banks and other non-bank ﬁnancial
intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP averaged over 1980-89 and the log of the average physical capital
stock per capita in a given country during the same period.
20When production functions are not Cobb-Douglas or CES, diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development across countries
could generate variation in the parameters αi and σi across countries. Data limitations however preclude us from
performing similar tests for other countries.
194.4 Direction of Capital Flows with Free Trade
We next consider under which conditions the ranking of factor prices derived in Proposition 3
survives in our general model. Note that whenever both North and South produce good 2 in
equilibrium, the zero-proﬁt condition in that sector ensures
p = c2
¡
δj,wj¢
for j = N,S,( 1 8 )
where c2 (·) is a general neoclassical unit cost function a n di st h u si n c r e a s i n gi nb o t ha r g u m e n t s .
Hence, as in our benchmark model and unlike in the autarkic case, with free trade in good 2 it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a te i t h e rwS >w N or δS >δ N. On the other hand, for a general constant
returns to scale technology in sector 2, we must also have that
wj
δj = ϑ
Ã
K
j
2
L
j
2
!
for j = N,S, (19)
where ϑ(·) is necessarily increasing in K
j
2/L
j
2. Equations (18) and (19) combined imply that the
ranking of factor prices is necessarily as derived in Proposition 3 provided that North operates
the technology in the unconstrained sector 2 at a higher capital-labor ratio than South does,
KN
2 /LN
2 >K S
2 /LS
2, which is an empirically likely scenario.
In our benchmark model, the condition KN
2 /LN
2 >K S
2 /LS
2 is ensured by the fact that North
specializes in the constrained sector 1, which operates at an ineﬃciently low capital-labor ratio.21
In Appendix A.2, we conﬁrm that this is not an artifact of our Cobb-Douglas assumptions: for
general homothetic preferences and general symmetric production functions with constant returns
to scale and diminishing marginal products, we obtain that capital intensity will be lower in the
constrained sector 1 than in the unconstrained sector 2, and with free trade, the rental rate is
higher in South than in North.22 This allows us to conclude that:
Proposition 7 In our general model, whenever sectors diﬀer only in ﬁnancial dependence and
North is at least as relatively capital-abundant as South, trade integration not only raises the real
rental rate of capital in South but it leaves this rental at a higher level in South than in the more
ﬁnancially developed North.
Whenever sectors diﬀer not only in ﬁnancial dependence but also in capital intensity, it is no
longer the case that free trade necessarily results in a larger rental rate in the South (see Appendix
21An interesting implication of this result is that, in our benchmark model, Northern exports are less capital
i n t e n s i v et h a nN o r t h e r ni m p o r t s . M o r eg enerally, as long as North and South diﬀer only in their level of ﬁnancial
development and production technologies are suﬃciently symmetric, North is necessarily a net importer of capital
services embodied in goods. Hence, credit constraints may provide an explanation for the so-called Leontief paradox
(see Wynne, 2005, for more on this).
22We have assumed throughout that the ﬁnancial constraint binds both in the North and in the South. It is
straightforward to show that if the constraint does not bind in the North, then trade integration continues to raise
the rental rate of capital in the South, but the model delivers factor price equalization (and the elimination of Southern
entrepreneurial rents) with free trade.
20A.2 for details). For instance, if the unconstrained sector happens to be particularly labor intensive
and North and South have similar aggregate capital-labor ratios, then it could well be the case
that δN >δ S with free trade. These conditions appear however to be counterfactual given the
empirical evidence reviewed in the last subsection. In Appendix A.2, we also show that for general
asymmetric production functions, the Southern rental under free trade will always exceed the
Northern one provided that North is suﬃciently capital abundant relative to South.23
4.5 Relationship with Other Notions of Complementarity
In the introduction we were careful to deﬁne our notion of complementarity between trade and
capital mobility in terms of the incentives for capital to ﬂow to a particular country. According
to our deﬁnition, in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade and capital movements are substitutes from
the point of view of capital-scarce economies, while in our model they are complements from the
point of view of ﬁnancially underdeveloped economies.
The substitutability between trade and capital movements in the Heckscher-Ohlin model is also
often understood in other manners. First, substitutability is associated with the prediction of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model that capital movements across countries tend to reduce trade ﬂows across
countries. In our model, capital movements can increase or decrease trade ﬂows depending on the
level of trade costs. As Proposition 4 indicates, when trade frictions are large, capital will ﬂow
from South to North. Furthermore, since the allocation of capital to the constrained sector is
unaﬀected by trade or capital ﬂows across countries, this capital movement will necessarily expand
the comparative disadvantage sector in North, while it will contract the comparative advantage
sector in South, thus tending to reduce trade ﬂows across countries. Conversely, when trade frictions
are small, capital will instead ﬂow from the comparative disadvantage sector in the North to the
comparative advantage sector in the South, hence increasing trade ﬂo w sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .T h i st y p e
of complementarity generated by our model is closer in spirit to that in Markusen (1983), but it is
important to emphasize that it only arises when trade frictions are low, as opposed to our preferred
notion of complementarity, which holds more generally.
Second, trade and capital movements are sometimes thought to be substitute when they act as
alternative means to bring about factor price equalization in the world. In his seminal contribution,
Mundell (1957) stressed the fact not only is it true that trade in goods can bring about factor price
equalization (FPE) and eliminate the incentive for capital to ﬂow across countries, but it is also
the case that capital movements across countries will arbitrage away factor cost diﬀerences across
countries and will eliminate the need to trade across countries. Again, our model does not feature
this type of substitutability. As argued earlier, whenever ﬁnancial constraints bind, FPE is only
reached in our model when there is free mobility of goods across countries and free mobility of
rentier capital across countries. Hence, neither trade nor capital movements can substitute for the
23It should be clear, however, that the likelihood of a reversal in the direction of capital movements brought about
by trade integration is not necessarily higher when diﬀerences in aggregate capital-labor ratios are high, because these
diﬀerences might also induce an autarky rental rate in the South that exceeds the Northern one.
21other in bringing about FPE.
5 The Complementarity with Capital Accumulation
Up to now we have studied the interaction of ﬁnancial frictions and trade integration in shaping
the desired location of physical capital. We concluded that when trade frictions are signiﬁcant,
there is an incentive for physical capital to migrate from the ﬁnancially underdeveloped South
to the ﬁnancially developed North, while the opposite is true when trade is frictionless. In this
section we introduce saving and capital accumulation decisions in order to show how our main
complementarity result carries over to intertemporal decisions.
As a corollary, by modeling the net capital ﬂows implications of our view, we are also able to
connect with the “global imbalances” literature, which attempts to explain the large capital ﬂows
from South to North observed in recent years. The main substantive conclusion that emerges from
the analysis below is that protectionism could exacerbate rather than alleviate these “imbalances”
if ﬁnancial factors are important determinants of trade patterns.
5.1 A Dynamic Model
Consider the following dynamic model which integrates a variant of the single-good framework of
Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) with the static international trade model developed in the
previous sections.
Time evolves continuously. Inﬁnitesimal agents are born at a rate φ per unit time and die at
the same rate; population mass is constant and equal to L. All agents are endowed with one unit
of labor services which they supply inelastically to the market.24 Agents save all their income and
consume only when they (are about to) die.25 Thus, if W
j,i
t denotes the savings accumulated by
agents of type i = e (entrepreneurs) and i = r (rentiers) in country j up to date t, then aggregate
consumption for each of these groups at time t is φW
j,i
t . This aggregate consumption is allocated
across the diﬀerent goods according to the instantaneous utility given by (1) for given equilibrium
prices, and subject to the budget constraint:
φW
j,i
t = C
ij
1t + p
j
tC
ij
2t.
Physical capital is tradable and is the only store of value. We assume that the initial stock
of capital is equal to K
j
0 and that new physical capital can be produced one-to-one with a non-
tradable ﬁnal good that combines goods 1 and 2 according to the utility aggregator in (1). Perfect
competition in the production of capital ensures that the relative price of capital is equal to the
24To simplify matters we do not distinguish between workers and capitalists in this section. Our previous results
on w, δ,a n dλ can be interpreted as applying to the diﬀerent components of an agent’s income.
25This can be interpreted as agents saving to provide for their long retirement. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas
(2008) show that the crucial features of the equilibrium described below survive to more general overlapping generation
structures, such as that in Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1987).
22ideal price index, that is,
³
p
j
t
´1−η
. For simplicity, we rule out any capital depreciation.26
Entrepreneurs are born as such, and at any given instant they constitute a share μ of the
population. As in the static model, they naturally specialize in sector 1. Entrepreneurial rents
are not capitalizable (i.e., they cannot be used as store of value). This is consistent with our
formulation in Appendix A.1, where these rents stem from the inalienability of the human capital
of entrepreneurs. Note that the existence of entrepreneurial rents implies that entrepreneurs (on
average) accumulate more savings than non-entrepreneurs over their life-span, and hence their share
of wealth (that is, capital) in the economy is no longer given by the parameter μ. Let us denote
this share by ˜ μ
j
t = K
j,e
t /K
j
t,w h e r eK
j,e
t is the amount of capital owned by entrepreneurs at any
instant t.
At any point in time, factor prices are determined exactly as in the static model developed
above with ˜ μ
j
t replacing μ. Nevertheless, in this dynamic model, physical capital plays a dual role
as a productive factor and also as a store of value. Capital ﬂows will be the mechanism by which
the claims on this store of value are traded across borders and the key price that determines the
direction of these capital ﬂows is the interest rate r in each country before opening the capital
account. We turn next to the determination of interest rates.
Let q
j
t denote the value for a rentier of holding one unit of capital in country j = N,S at any
instant t. In equilibrium, q
j
t is also the market price of a unit of capital, that is q
j
t =
³
p
j
t
´1−η
,s i n c e
(surviving) agents spend all their income in buying capital and rentiers are always the marginal
buyers. The return on holding a unit of capital is then equal to the dividend price ratio δ
j
t/q
j
t plus
the capital gain ˙ q
j
t/q
j
t or:
r
j
t =
δ
j
t ³
p
j
t
´1−η +( 1− η)
˙ p
j
t
p
j
t
.( 2 0 )
Aggregate savings of each group (entrepreneurs and rentiers) decrease with consumption, and
increase with labor income, entrepreneurial rents (if any) and the return on accumulated savings:
˙ W
j,r
t = −φW
j,r
t +( 1− μ)w
j
tL + r
j
tW
j,r
t , (21)
˙ W
j,e
t = −φW
j,e
t + μw
j
tL + λ
j
tθj˜ μ
j
tK
j
t + r
j
tW
j,e
t . (22)
With a closed capital account, it must be the case that aggregate savings equal the value of the
capital stock at all times:
W
j,r
t + W
j,e
t = q
j
tK
j
t =
³
p
j
t
´1−η
K
j
t. (23)
Combining (23) and (20), and using the sum of (21) and (22), we have that
φ
³
W
j,r
t + W
j,e
t
´
+
³
p
j
t
´1−η
˙ K
j
t = δ
j
tK
j
t + w
j
tL + λ
j
tθj˜ μ
j
tK
j
t ≡ Y
j
t ,( 2 4 )
26In a previous version of the model (Antràs and Caballero, 2007), we assumed that the stock of physical capital
was ﬁxed, as in Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008). This led to a distinct determination of the relative price of
capital, but to the same qualitative results as those derived below.
23where the left-hand side measures the sum of country j’s aggregate consumption and investment
at any instant t, and the right-hand side measures aggregate income and output Y
j
t .
Equations (20) through (23) describe the dynamic evolution of the economy, together with
the expressions for factor prices and the relative price p
j
t derived in previous sections with ˜ μ
j
t
replacing μ. We hereafter focus on exploring the steady state of the benchmark model developed
in section 2, which allows for a simple analytic illustration of our results.27 In Appendix A.4,
we show that regardless of the initial value of K
j
0 and as long as μθj <η(i.e., Assumption 1),
the economy will converge to a steady state in which K
j
t and ˜ μ
j
t are constant (implying that p
j
t,
w
j
t, δ
j
t and λ
j
t are constant as well). Furthermore, in Appendix A.4 we show that ˜ μj necessarily
settles at a value larger than μ but lower than η/θj, and hence ﬁnancial constraints bind even in
the long-run. Intuitively, although entrepreneurs obtain a higher income period by period (thus
leading to ˜ μj >μ ),t h eﬁnite-horizon nature of our model implies that the distribution of wealth
remains non-degenerate. We also show in Appendix A.4 that ˜ μj is a function of factor prices, which
remember are themselves functions of ˜ μj. These interactions between equilibrium factor prices and
the tightness of the ﬁnancial constraint complicate the mechanics of the model, but as illustrated
below, the analysis remains tractable.
We next compute the equilibrium steady-state interest rate in our benchmark model with and
without free trade. Setting ˙ p
j
t =0in equation (20) and dropping time subscripts, we obtain
rj =
δj
(pj)
1−η,( 2 5 )
and thus the steady-state interest rate naturally equals the rental rate of capital in terms of the
composite good from which physical capital is made. In the static model, we demonstrated that
the autarky real rental rate of capital is depressed in the ﬁnancially underdeveloped South and
that the Southern real rental increases with a process of trade integration with a more ﬁnancially
developed North. Our dynamic model features capital accumulation and one might worry that
these results might be overturned by an endogenously lower aggregate capital-labor ratio in the
South under autarky and by an endogenous increase in the Southern capital-labor ratio following
trade liberalization. Although our dynamic model does feature these endogenous responses of the
aggregate capital-labor ratio, we next show that our main complementarity result continues to hold
in the steady state.
To see this, consider ﬁrst the case in which North and South are closed to international trade.
Combining equations (8), (9), (11), and (15), together with (20), (23) and (24) — while setting
˙ p
j
t = ˙ K
j
t =0—y i e l d s :
K
j
aut
L
=
µ
Z
φ
¶1/(1−α) Ã
˜ μ
j
autθj
η
!αη/(1−α) Ã
1 − ˜ μ
j
autθj
1 − η
!α(1−η)/(1−α)
(26)
27See Antràs and Caballero (2009) for a fuller exploration of our dynamic framework.
24and
r
j
aut = φα
1 − η
1 − ˜ μ
j
autθj,( 2 7 )
where ˜ μ
j
aut is the autarky steady state share of capital in the hands of entrepreneurs in country j.
We show in Appendix A.4 that although the expression for ˜ μ
j
aut is complicated, the term ˜ μ
j
autθj is
necessarily an increasing function of θj and satisﬁes ˜ μ
j
autθj <η . As a result of this, the autarkic
capital-labor ratio is an increasing function of θj and is thus higher in the North than in the South.
In spite of this, equation (27) indicates that, as in our static model, the autarkic real rental rate —
and thus the interest rate — continues to be an increasing function of θj, which implies that South
experiences a capital outﬂow if it integrates to global capital markets when trade frictions are large.
The low interest rate in South reﬂects the fact that the rental capital income, the only capital-
izable income in the economy, is depressed by the ﬁnancial friction. In this dynamic version of the
model, ﬁnancial frictions also lower the steady-state value of the capital-labor ratio, but the latter
eﬀect is a dominated one in shaping the determination of the rental rate of capital.
We can contrast this autarky result with the polar opposite case where trade is frictionless.
Plugging the equilibrium values of factor prices under free trade into (25), and using (23) and (24)
yields
K
j
open
L
=
Ã
Z
φ
¡
˜ μj
openθj +
¡
1 − ˜ μj
openθj¢
p1/α¢α
p1−η
!1/(1−α)
.( 2 8 )
and
rj
open = φα
p1/α
˜ μj
openθj +
¡
1 − ˜ μj
openθj¢
p1/α,( 2 9 )
where ˜ μj
open is the steady state share of capital in the hands of entrepreneurs under free trade.
Although the equation deﬁning ˜ μj
open is also complicated, we show in Appendix A.4 that ˜ μj
openθj
is again necessarily increasing in θj and is also decreasing in p. Inspection of (29) reveals that this
in turn implies that the steady state interest rate is increasing in p and decreasing in θj.I nw o r d s ,
a process of trade liberalization (an increase in p) raises the interest rate in the South to the point
that South actually experiences capital inﬂows if it integrates to global capital markets when trade
is free. Hence, in analogy to Propositions 2 and 5, we have that:
Proposition 8 Trade integration raises the interest rate in the ﬁnancially underdeveloped South.
Furthermore, with free trade, the interest rate is higher in the South than in the North, while the
converse is true under autarky.
The logic behind the complementarity between trade and capital ﬂows is related to that in the
static model. By specializing in the unconstrained sector, rentiers’ capital in the South beneﬁts
from a larger amount of labor allocated to the unconstrained sector and thus earns higher returns.
Furthermore, with free trade, rentier capital ends up working with a disproportionate amount of
labor in economies with lower credit multipliers and this translates into disproportionately large
returns. As a result, a larger share of capital income is in the form of capitalizable rents and the
25return to ﬁnancial capital is higher.28
We next turn to studying intermediate levels of openness, which corresponds to situations with
varying degrees of international specialization.
5.2 An Application: Protectionism Backﬁres
Protectionist proposals are a standard policy reaction to the so called “global imbalances” that
have characterized the global economy in recent years. The rationale for these proposals is that by
raising trade barriers in North, the magnitude of trade surpluses in South must decline. We argue
in this section that if the global imbalances are an equilibrium response to heterogenous degrees of
ﬁnancial development across the world, protectionism may exacerbate rather than reduce them. We
illustrate the reason behind our warning by showing that the pre-integration North-South interest
rate spread, which is the main factor behind the direction of capital ﬂows in our model, rises with
trade frictions.
Let us extend the interest rate expression in (29) to cases of intermediate levels of trade frictions.
As in section 3.2, we consider situations in which sector 1’s output can be freely tradable, while a
fraction τ ∈ (0,1) of sector 2’s output melts in transit when shipped across countries. For simplicity,
we also maintain the assumption that South is a small open economy. As a result, the relative price
in South is pN (1 − τ) and the steady-state interest rate in each country becomes:
rN = φα
¡
pN¢1/α
˜ μNθN +
¡
1 − ˜ μNθN¢
(pN)
1/α;
rS = φα
¡
pN (1 − τ)
¢1/α
˜ μSθS +
¡
1 − ˜ μSθS¢
(pN (1 − τ))
1/α.
Notice that even for a common share of entrepreneurs μ in both countries, the share of entrepre-
neurial wealth in total wealth diﬀers across countries (˜ μN 6=˜ μS). An increase in τ impacts the
diﬀerence rN − rS through a direct eﬀect apparent in the formula for rS above, as well as through
an indirect eﬀect working through the steady state value of ˜ μS. It turns out, however, that both
eﬀects work in the same direction and we can establish that, for a given pN, the diﬀerence rN −rS
is strictly increasing in τ.29 Furthermore, our previous results allow us to conclude that:
28An additional feature that emerges in the dynamic model is that trade liberalization generates endogenous changes
in the tightness of the credit constraint. In Appendix A.4, we show that ˜ μ
S
open < ˜ μ
S
aut (since trade lowers λ
S), and
hence the Southern share of capital in the hands of entrepreneurs is lower in the free trade equilibrium than under
autarky. By allowing the economy to specialize in the sector with less ﬁnancial constraints, entrepreneurial rents
are eroded and wealth inequality is reduced in the long run. Naturally, this implies that, contrary to our static
model, the allocation of capital across sectors will not remain unaﬀected by a process of trade liberalization. As the
economy transitions to the new steady state, the fraction of capital in sector 1 gradually falls and that in sector 2
increases. It is straightforward to verify that, in our benchmark model, these endogenous changes in ˜ μ lead to a
gradual tightening of credit constraints along the transition. As a result, the welfare gains from trade liberalization
are much less clear-cut than in the static model. See Chesnokova (2007) for a related point.
29It is clear from inspection of the formula for r
S that the direct eﬀect of τ on r
S is negative. Furthermore, in
Appendix A.4, we show that ˜ μ
S is decreasing in the relative price faced by South. A larger τ then increases ˜ μ
S,a n d
hence further reduces r
S (since in our benchmark model r
S is decreasing in ˜ μ
Sθ
S for a given relative price p).
26Proposition 9 There exists a unique level of trade frictions ˜ τ ∈
¡
0,1 − pS
aut/pN¢
such that for
τ<˜ τ we have rN <r S,w h i l ef o rτ>˜ τ we have rN >r S. Consequently, savings ﬂow South when
τ<˜ τ and North if τ>˜ τ.
This result is analogous to Proposition 4, now applied to capital ﬂows. To see its implication,
suppose that the initial level of trade frictions is τ0 ≥ ˜ τ so that rN ≥ rS.T h e nﬁnancial integration
leads to capital outﬂows from South to North, a situation that captures the current scenario between
emerging Asia and the U.S. In fact, in our model with no adjustment costs of capital, ﬁnancial
integration would lead to an instantaneous capital ﬂight that would lead to equalization of the
marginal product of capital (in terms of the freely tradable numeraire good).
We now want to compare the impact of ﬁnancial integration for diﬀerent values of the trade
friction τ ≥ ˜ τ. It is clear from the above discussion that the larger is τ, the larger is the gap
rN −rS. Because of diminishing returns to capital, it then ﬂows that the initial capital outﬂow (or
trade surplus) in the South will be larger the larger is τ.30 That is, protectionism backﬁres (if the
goal is to reduce North’s trade deﬁcits).
In our derivations we have treated South as small relative to North, but it should be apparent
that our substantive results do not depend on this assumption. The main signiﬁcant diﬀerence is
that, in the two-large region model, ﬁnancial integration also reduces the interest rate in North,
thus reducing the size of the capital movements needed to equalize the return to capital.
5.3 An Application and Extension: High Saving Rate in Regions of South
The implication that regions in South that are more open to trade are more prone to receive
net capital inﬂows may appear as counterfactual when comparing Asia and Latin America. The
economies in the former region are at least as open as those in the latter, but they typically run
current account surpluses that are signiﬁcantly larger than those of Latin American economies.
However, there is no contradiction once one also considers that Asian economies have much higher
saving rates.
Our dynamic model is ﬂexible enough to accommodate such situations. In particular, suppose
that South is split between high and low saving regions – for example, Asia and Latin America,
respectively. Because consumption in any instant is equal to a fraction φ of wealth, a natural way
to capture this diﬀerent propensity to consume is to have
φS,Asia <φ N <φ S,LA.
If all countries in South have identical ﬁnancial markets, endowments, technology, and instanta-
neous utility functions at the time of death, then it follows that before opening the capital account
30For simplicity, we focus here on a comparison of the impact eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration for diﬀerent values of
τ. In Antràs and Caballero (2009) we further characterize the transitional dynamics following ﬁnancial integration
in a model that features adjustment costs to capital.
27we have
rS,Asia =
φS,Asia
φS,LA rS,LA <r S,LA.
More generally, high savings countries in South need to be more open to trade than low saving
countries in order to experience net capital inﬂows.31
6F i n a l R e m a r k s
The main message of this paper is that when variation in ﬁnancial development and ﬁnancial
dependence are signiﬁcant determinants of comparative advantage, trade and capital ﬂows become
complements in ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries. This complementarity contrasts with the
substitutability that arises for capital-scarce countries in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell
framework, and has important practical implications. For example, it indicates that deepening
trade liberalization in South raises its ability to attract foreign capital. At the global level, it
implies that protectionist policies aimed at reducing the so called “global imbalances” may backﬁre
and exacerbate them. And while we do not analyze the normative aspects of liberalization processes,
our framework hints that it is important for developing economies to liberalize trade before the
capital account, if capital outﬂows are to be averted.
Our complementarity follows from the fact that trade liberalization decouples the process of
labor allocation from local demand conditions. In this context, a ﬁnancially underdeveloped country
is able to allocate a disproportionate amount of workers in sectors in which ﬁnancial frictions are less
severe, thereby increasing the marginal product of capital and its equilibrium rental rate. Although
we initially derived this result for the case in which South is a small open economy and preferences
and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, we later demonstrated that the result is general. In particular,
in a world in which countries diﬀer only in ﬁnancial development and sectors diﬀer only in ﬁnancial
dependence, trade integration necessarily reduces (and actually overturns) the gap between the
real return to capital in North and South. Furthermore, even after introducing Heckscher-Ohlin
determinants of trade, our complementarity result continues to hold under empirically plausible
conditions.
31Our model oﬀers an alternative explanation for Latin America attracting larger net capital inﬂows than Asia
despite being less open to trade. In particular, just as in our static model, the amount of trade integration needed
to ensure net capital inﬂows into South is lower the lower is ﬁnancial development in South. Hence, the observed
patterns are also consistent with Latin America being less ﬁnancially developed than Asia.
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30Appendix
A. 1 Microfoundations of the Financial Constraint
In the main text, we simply imposed the assumption that Bi ≤ (θ − 1)Ki for some constant θ>1,w h e r e
Bi is the amount of capital rented by entrepreneur i,a n dKi is i’s capital endowment. In this Appendix,
we provide a simple microfoundation for this assumption, which builds on limited commitment on the part
of entrepreneurs, along the lines of Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2006).
In particular, assume that the entrepreneur can always walk away from the project before production
occurs (but after investment has taken place), and renege on all debt obligations in doing so. Suppose that
the human capital of the entrepreneur is necessary for production to occur. If the entrepreneur refused
to put his/her skills to use after obtaining the funds from investors, then revenue would be zero (human
capital is inalienable) and all that investors could recoup is a fraction ϕ ∈ (0,1)of the installed capital,
i.e., ϕ
¡
Ki + Bi¢
. Suppose that investors were allowed to rent this saved collateral in sector 2, which
would yield them a payoﬀ of δϕ
¡
Ki + Bi¢
.W e c a n t h i n k o f ϕ as our new primitive index of ﬁnancial
development. Regardless of the value of ϕ,e ﬃciency dictates that the entrepreneur does not walk away and
carries out production; but if lenders have weak bargaining power, the entrepreneur is able to use the threat
of withholding his/her human capital services to renegotiate the terms of the loan. With full bargaining
power, the payoﬀ to lenders can be pushed all the way down to δϕ
¡
Ki + Bi¢
. Foreseeing this ex-post
renegotiation, investors only lend to entrepreneurs if their payoﬀ is at least as large as the return they could
obtain in the unconstrained sector 2, which is δBi. The participation constraint of investors hence imposes
that δBi ≤ δϕ
¡
Ki + Bi¢
or
Bi ≤
ϕ
1 − ϕ
Ki.
By setting θ = 1
1−ϕ > 1, we have the exact same formulation as in our main text, with a larger θ being
associated with a larger collateral value of capital (larger ϕ).
We can also consider an alternative formulation in which the collateral value of capital is zero, but
lenders (rentier capitalists) are not completely unable to produce in sector 1. In particular, suppose that if
the entrepreneur walked away, rentiers could use the installed capital to produce a fraction ϕ of sector 1’s
output. In this formulation, ϕ is negatively related to the complexity ofp r o d u c t i o ni ns e c t o r1 .T h eo u t s i d e
option of lenders in this case would be, for the benchmark model,
πR =m a x
L
n
ϕZ
¡
Ki + Bi¢α
(L)
1−α − wL
o
= αϕZ
µ
(1 − α)ϕZ
w
¶(1−α)/α ¡
Ki + Bi¢
,
and with full bargaining power on the part of entrepreneurs, the participation constraint for rentiers would
now be:
δBi ≤ αϕZ
µ
(1 − α)ϕZ
w
¶(1−α)/α ¡
Ki + Bi¢
.
In terms of the notation used in the main text, this formulation implies
θ − 1=
αϕZ
³
(1−α)ϕZ
w
´(1−α)/α
δ − αϕZ
³
(1−α)ϕZ
w
´(1−α)/α. (30)
Notice that the credit multiplier θ is now a function of factor prices, but because ﬁrms take these prices
as exogenous, ﬁrm behavior is identical to that in the main text. The main diﬀerence is that, in solving for
31the general equilibrium, one has to be careful in acknowledging the dependence of θ(w,δ) on w and δ.A n
implication of the analysis is that now trade aﬀects the tightness of the constraint.
Despite these nuances, our main result on the complementarity between trade integration and net capital
inﬂows in South is robust to this more general formulation of the benchmark model. To see this, consider
ﬁrst the equilibrium of a small open economy, where remember that
w =( 1 − α)Z
µ³
(1 − μθ(w,δ))p1/α + μθ(w,δ)
´ K
L
¶α
δ = αZp1/α
µ³
(1 − μθ(w,δ))p1/α + μθ(w,δ)
´ K
L
¶α−1
(31)
Plugging these two expressions into (30), we end up with a fairly simple formula for θ in terms of ϕ and p:
θ =
1
1 −
³
ϕ
p
´1/α. (32)
This shows that, for a given p, large ϕ countries are also large θ countries, just as in our previous
formulation. Furthermore, θ is a decreasing function of p, and hence the tightness of the ﬁnancial constraint
increases when trade liberalization increases the relative price p.B e c a u s et h er e n t a lδ in (31) is increasing in p
and decreasing in θ, it follows that overall we must have that δ is increasing in p, which is our complementarity
result (δ/p is increasing in pas well). We can similarly show that w/δ is decreasing in p,w h i c hc o n ﬁrms our
anti-Stolper-Samuelson result.
Finally, it remains to show that the relative price p increases in South when trade frictions are reduced.
To prove this, it suﬃces to show that the autarky relative price p is an increasing function of the primitive
index ϕ of ﬁnancial development (so that ϕN >ϕ S implies pN >p S). Because p is increasing in the
endogenous tightness θ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt os h o w i n gt h a tθ in (32) is increasing in ϕ when evaluated at the
equilibrium autarky relative price p =( μθ(1 − η)/(η(1 − μθ)))
α. This yields
θ =
μ(1 − η)+ηϕ1/α
μ(1 − η)+μηϕ1/α,
w h i c hi si n d e e di n c r e a s i n gi nϕ. In sum, even accounting for the endogenous response of the credit constraint,
in our benchmark model, trade integration allows South to trade at a higher relative price p and this
necessarily increases the real rental rate of capital.
A. 2 The Static Model with General Functional Forms
In this Appendix we provide further mathematical details on our “general model”, which features general
neoclassical production functions and general homothetic preferences. Letting k = K/L, we denote output
per worker under each of the two production technologies by f1 (k) and f2 (k).
Let us ﬁrst consider the equilibrium of the closed economy. As in the main text, we assume that θ is
low enough to ensure that the credit constraint binds and the amount of capital allocated to sector 1 is
K1 = μθK. Letting ψ1 denote the share of labor allocation to sector 1, the equilibrium conditions of this
32closed economy are:
ψ1f1
µ
μθ
ψ1
K
L
¶
= κ(p)(1− ψ1)f2
µ
1 − μθ
1 − ψ1
K
L
¶
f0
1
µ
μθ
ψ1
K
L
¶
= δ + λ
f1
µ
μθ
ψ1
K
L
¶
− f0
1
µ
μθ
ψ1
K
L
¶
μθ
ψ1
K
L
= w
pf0
2
µ
1 − μθ
1 − ψ1
K
L
¶
= δ
pf2
µ
1 − μθ
1 − ψ1
K
L
¶
− pf0
2
µ
1 − μθ
1 − ψ1
K
L
¶
1 − μθ
1 − ψ1
K
L
= w. (33)
The ﬁrst condition ensures goods-market equilibrium (remember that κ(p) denotes the relative demand
for good 1). The next two conditions characterize factor demand in sector 1, while the last two ones char-
acterize factor demand in sector 2. Log-diﬀerentiating the above system (33) and after a few manipulations
we obtain:
ˆ ψ1 + α1
³
ˆ θ − ˆ ψ1 + ˆ k
´
= −
ψ1
(1 − ψ1)
ˆ ψ1 + εb p + α2
µ
−
μθ
1 − μθ
b θ +
ψ1
(1 − ψ1)
ˆ ψ1 + ˆ k
¶
−
(1 − α1)
σ1
³
ˆ θ − ˆ ψ1 + ˆ k
´
=
δ
δ + λ
ˆ δ +
λ
δ + λ
ˆ λ
0=( 1 − α1)ˆ w + α1
µ
δ
δ + λ
ˆ δ +
λ
δ + λ
ˆ λ
¶
ˆ δ = b p −
(1 − α2)
σ2
µ
−
μθ
1 − μθ
b θ +
ψ1
(1 − ψ1)
ˆ ψ1 + ˆ k
¶
b p =( 1 − α2)ˆ w + α2ˆ δ, (34)
where hats denote percentage changes in the variables and the following deﬁnitions have been used:
αi ≡ f0
i (ki)ki/fi (ki)
σi ≡
∂ lnki
∂ ln
³
fi(ki)−f0
i(ki)ki
f0
i(ki)
´
ε ≡ κ0 (p)p/κ(p)
These correspond to sector i’s elasticity of output with respect to capital (or one minus the labor share in
sector i), sector i’s elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and the elasticity of substitution in
consumption between goods 1 and 2.
The system (34) can be solved to obtain ˆ p, ˆ w, ˆ δ, ˆ λ,a n dˆ ψ1 as a function of b θ and ˆ k. These expressions shed
light on the cross-country variation in prices and the allocation of labor under autarky. We are particularly
interested in exploring whether the relative price p is larger in North or South. After some fairly cumbersome
33algebra we obtain
ˆ p =

1−α1+
ψ1
(1−ψ1)(1−α2)


1+
σ1α2
α1σ2
ψ1
(1−ψ1)

³
1+σ1
α1
α2
σ2
μθ
1−μθ
´
+
³
α1 + α2
μθ
1−μθ
´
ε + σ1
α1

1−α1+
ψ1
(1−ψ1)(1−α2)


1+
σ1α2
α1σ2
ψ1
(1−ψ1)

b θ
+
(α1σ2 (1 − α2) − (1 − α1)σ1α2)
µ
ε + σ1
α1

1−α1+
ψ1
(1−ψ1)(1−α2)


1+
σ1α2
α1σ2
ψ1
(1−ψ1)

¶
(α1σ2 (1 − ψ1)+ψ1σ1α2)
ˆ k, (35)
which conﬁrms our claim in Proposition 6.
We can now move to an analysis of the small open economy. Our goal here is to show that, for general
technologies and preferences, the real rental rate of capital is an increasing function of p. We again log-
diﬀerentiate the above system but this time ignoring the goods-market condition and treating p as parametric.
This amounts to solving for ˆ w, ˆ δ, ˆ λ,a n dˆ ψ1 as a function of ˆ p, ˆ θ and ˆ k. We focus here on the value of ˆ δ :
ˆ δ =
(ψ1σ1 + α1σ2 (1 − ψ1))
(ψ1σ1α2 + α1σ2 (1 − ψ1))
ˆ p −
(ψ1 − θμ)α1 (1 − α2)
(α1σ2 (1 − ψ1)+ψ1σ1α2)(1− θμ)
ˆ θ −
α1 (1 − α2)
(α1σ2 (1 − ψ1)+ψ1σ1α2)
ˆ k.
Notice that the rental rate δ is necessarily increasing in p,a n ds oi sδ/p,s i n c et h ec o e ﬃcient of ˆ p is
strictly larger than one (for α2 < 1). Hence, as long as long as trade integration raises the relative price p
in South, it also raises the rental rate of capital in terms of both sectors’ output.
This conﬁrms the validity of Proposition 5 as long as pN
aut >p S
aut is a suﬃcient condition for p increasing
in South as a result of trade integration. In the small open economy case, this is obvious, but it remains
the case for the case in which both countries are large. In such a case, it will still necessarily be the case
that the world equilibrium price will fall somewhere between the two autarky relative prices, and thus trade
integration corresponds to an increase in p from the point of view of South whenever pN
aut >p S
aut.T h e
key for this result is that relative demand of good 1 in each country is monotonically increasing in p (due
to homothetic preferences), while relative supply of good 1 in each country is monotonically decreasing
in p (because K1 is independent of p, while L1 decreases in p). Hence, for any price outside the interval
(pN
aut,p S
aut), an excess relative demand in one country would not be compensated by an excess relative supply
in the other country. This same argument explains why the South will feature net exports of good 2 as long
as pN
aut >p S
aut. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
As discussed in the main text, the rise in δ (and δ/p) induced by trade is the key feature that leads
to complementarity between trade ﬂows and capital ﬂows in our model. Whether the increase in δ is large
enough to lead to δ
S >δ
N with free trade depends on whether relative factor endowment diﬀerences are
large relative to factor intensity diﬀerences and diﬀerences in ﬁnancial contractibility. To be more precise,
the condition that ensures δ
S >δ
N is given by:
µ
ψ1
1 − ψ1
−
μθ
1 − μθ
¶
ˆ θ +
µ
1
1 − ψ1
¶
b k>0.
Or, more simply, all that we require is that North operates sector 2’s technology at a higher capital-labor ratio
than South does. As argued in the main text, suﬃciently large diﬀerences in capital-labor ratios between
North and South will ensure that this condition is satisﬁed.
It is straightforward to show, however, that this condition also holds in the case of symmetric (neoclassi-
34cal) production functions and no diﬀerences in K/L across countries. In such a case, the analog of equation
(5) equating the value of the marginal product of labor across sectors is
FL
Ã
μθ
jK
ψ
j
1L
!
= pFL
⎛
⎝
¡
1 − μθ
j¢
K
³
1 − ψ
j
1
´
L
⎞
⎠,f o rj = N,S, (36)
where FL (·) denotes the marginal product of labor and F0
L (·) > 0. As shown above, for general homothetic
preferences and symmetric production functions, it continues to be the case that p<1 as long as the ﬁnancial
constraint binds in North. From equation (36), this immediately implies that ψ
j
1/
³
1 − ψ
j
1
´
>μ θ
j/
¡
1 − μθ
j¢
,
and thus δ
S >δ
N.T h i sc o n ﬁrms the validity of Proposition 7.
A. 3 External Dependence, Capital Intensity and Factor Substitution
In this Appendix we provide more details on the correlations reported in section 4. We follow Rajan
and Zingales (1997) in measuring ﬁnancial dependence as the fraction of total capital expenditures not
ﬁnanced by internal cash ﬂow. This is computed at the 3-digit SIC level and averaged over the period
1980-89 using Compustat data, as in Chor (2008). We correlate this measure with the labor share in that
industry (1 − αi), which we compute using the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, as the ratio
of total payroll to total value added in a given 3-digit industry, averaged over the period 1980-89. The
correlation between the two measures is 0.034. We next correlate ﬁnancial dependence with an estimate
of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in a given industry (σi). This latter measure
is computed as follows. The NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database provides data on total payroll,
number of employees, real capital stock and value added for each 4-digit SIC industry. With these series
we construct a proxy for the average wage-rental ratio (where, wage=payroll/employees and rental=(value
added-payroll)/real capital stock) and a average capital-labor ratio in a particular 3-digit SIC industry.
For each industry, we then run a regression of the capital-labor ratio on the wage-rental and a time trend
(that controls for factor-biased technological progress) during the period 1958-1996. The resulting estimates
are our measures of substitutability and their correlation with ﬁnancial dependence is equal to 0.012. We
have also experimented with running each 3-digit industry regression with 4-digit SIC level data, including
4-digit ﬁxed eﬀects that allow for Hicks-neutral shifts in technologies across subindustries within a 3-digit
industry). The results are very similar. Our ﬁnal exercise is to use the above measures to compute and
industry measure of αi/((1 − αi)σi), as suggested by the model in section 4. The correlation of this term
with ﬁnancial dependence continues to be very small (-0.026).
A. 4 Details on the Dynamic Model
In this Appendix we provide further details on the determination of the steady-state in our dynamic model in
section 5. Our ﬁrst goal is to reduce the dynamics of the model to two diﬀerential equations in two variables,
namely the capital stock K
j
t and the share of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs ˜ μ
j
t.
Closed Economy Equilibrium For the autarky case, ﬁrst plug equations (8), (9), (11), (15) and (23)
into (24) with ˜ μ
j
t replacing μ, to obtain the following law of motion equation for physical capital:
dK
j
t
dt
= Z
Ã
˜ μ
j
tθ
j
η
!αη Ã
1 − ˜ μ
j
tθ
j
1 − η
!α(1−η) ³
K
j
t
´α
L1−α − φK
j
t. (37)
35Working with equations (21) and (22), and plugging again (8), (9), (11), (15) and (23) we obtain the following
law of motion for the share of wealth ˜ μ
j
t in the hands of entrepreneurs:
d˜ μ
j
t
dt
=
"
α
³
1 − ˜ μ
j
t
´Ã
η − ˜ μ
j
tθ
j
1 − ˜ μ
j
tθ
j
!
−
³
˜ μ
j
t − μ
´
(1 − α)
#
Z
Ã
˜ μ
j
tθ
j
η
!αη Ã
1 − ˜ μ
j
tθ
j
1 − η
!α(1−η) Ã
K
j
t
L
!α−1
. (38)
Log-linearizing the system of diﬀerential equations in (37) and (38) around the steady state
¡
Kj, ˜ μj¢
,
we obtain
⎡
⎣
dlog(K
j
t)
dt
dlog(˜ μ
j
t)
dt
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎢
⎣
−(1 − α)φ (η−˜ μjθj)
˜ μjθj(1−˜ μjθj)αφ
0 −
µ
1+(θj−1)α(1−η)
(1−˜ μjθj)
2
¶
φ
⎤
⎥
⎦
⎡
⎣
log
³
K
j
t
´
− log
¡
Kj¢
log
³
˜ μ
j
t
´
− log
¡
˜ μj¢
⎤
⎦.
This immediately implies that the two eigenvalues associated with the dynamic system are both negative
and thus the system is stable. We can thus safely characterize the steady state of the system.
Next, setting dK
j
t/dt =0in (37) we obtain the steady-state physical capital stock in (26), while setting
the growth of ˜ μ
j
t in (38) to zero, we obtain that the steady-state value of ˜ μ
j
t must satisfy:
α
³
1 − ˜ μ
j
aut
´Ã
η − ˜ μ
j
autθ
j
1 − ˜ μ
j
autθ
j
!
−
³
˜ μ
j
aut − μ
´
(1 − α)=0 . (39)
We next verify that as long as Assumption 1 holds (i.e., η>μ θ ), this equation determines a unique solution
for ˜ μ
j
aut, and that this solution satisﬁes μθ
j < ˜ μ
j
autθ
j <η . Uniqueness of the solution follows from the fact
that the left-hand-side of (39) is monotonically decreasing in ˜ μ
j
aut.T h ef a c tt h a t˜ μ
j
autθ
j <ηcan be established
by contradiction. For any ˜ μ
j
t >η / θ
j, ﬁnancial constraints would not bind and entrepreneurs would obtain
no rents. Given the OLG structure of the model, this would imply that in a steady state equilibrium with
˜ μ
j
autθ
j >ηwe would necessarily have ˜ μ
j
aut = μ (this can be formally proved by solving for the steady-state
value of ˜ μ
j
aut whenever the Lagrange multiplier λ
j
t is set to 0). But then μθ
j =˜ μ
j
autθ
j >ηwould contradict
Assumption 1. Hence, we must have ˜ μ
j
autθ
j <η . Inspection of equation (39) then immediately reveals that
˜ μ
j
aut >μ . In words, the steady-state share of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs exceeds their share in the
population, but is never high enough to let the economy “escape” from ﬁnancial constraints.
For the main results in the main text, it is also important to show that ˜ μ
j
autθ
j is a monotonically
increasing function of θ
j. For that purpose, it is useful to deﬁne Λ
j
aut ≡ ˜ μ
j
autθ
j and rewrite equation (39) as
follows
α
³
θ
j − Λ
j
aut
´Ã
η − Λ
j
aut
1 − Λ
j
aut
!
−
³
Λ
j
aut − μθ
j
´
(1 − α)=0 .
Straightforward diﬀerentiation indicates that the left-hand-side is decreasing in Λ
j
aut and increasing in θ
j
(given that η>Λ
j
aut). Hence, by the implicit function theorem, we must have that Λ
j
aut ≡ ˜ μ
j
autθ
j is
increasing in θ
j.
Free Trade Equilibrium Working with equations (21), (22), (23), (24), and the expressions for factor
prices in the open-economy, static model (with ˜ μ
j
t replacing μ), we obtain the following laws of motion for
36physical capital and the share of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs:
dK
j
t
dt
=
³³
1 − ˜ μ
j
tθ
j
´
p1/α +˜ μ
j
tθ
j
´α
(p)
1−η Z
³
K
j
t
´α
L1−α − φK
j
t
d˜ μ
j
t
dt
=
α(1−˜ μ
j
t)(1−p1/α)˜ μ
j
tθj
((1−˜ μ
j
tθj)p1/α+˜ μ
j
tθj) −
³
˜ μ
j
t − μ
´
(1 − α)
(p)
1−η
³³
(1 − μθ)p1/α + μθ
´´α
Z
Ã
K
j
t
L
!α−1
,
where p is the relative price in the North, which for simplicity is assumed to have reached its steady state.
Log-linearizing the system of diﬀerential equations in (37) and (38) around the steady state, it is straight-
forward to verify that the system is stable, just as it was the case in the closed-economy case. Setting
dK
j
t/dt =0 , we then obtain the steady-state physical capital stock Kj
open in (28), while setting d˜ μ
j
t/dt =0 ,
we obtain that the steady-state value of ˜ μ
j
t must satisfy
α
¡
1 − ˜ μj
open
¢¡
1 − p1/α¢
¡¡
1 − ˜ μj
openθ
j¢
p1/α +˜ μj
openθ
j¢
˜ μj
openθ
j
¡
˜ μj
open − μ
¢
(1 − α)
=1 . (40)
It is clear from inspection of this expression that ˜ μj
open >μ , while ﬁnancial constraints will continue to
bind in the long-run (i.e., ˜ μj
open <η / θ
j) for the same reasons as in the closed-economy scenario. Simple
diﬀerentiation of the left-hand-side of this expression indicates that both terms are decreasing in ˜ μj
open, while
the ﬁrst one is clearly decreasing in p. By the implicit function theorem, it then follows that ˜ μj
open is lower
the larger is p, or in other words, trade liberalization lowers the share of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs
in South (and thus ˜ μS
open < ˜ μS
aut).
Finally, for some of our results it is also important to study how the product Λj
open =˜ μj
openθ
j is aﬀected
by p and θ
j. For this purpose we rewrite (40) as follows
α
¡
θ
j − Λj
open
¢¡
1 − p1/α¢
³³
1 − Λ
j
open
´
p1/α + Λ
j
open
´
Λj
open ³
Λ
j
open − μθ
j
´
(1 − α)
=1 .
It is clear from inspection of this expression that the left-hand-side is decreasing in Λj
open and p and increasing
in θ
j. Hence, by the implicit function theorem, Λj
open =˜ μj
openθ
j increases in θ
j and decreases in p,a sa r g u e d
in the main text.
37